8月GMAT閱讀機(jī)經(jīng):投資傾向的實(shí)驗(yàn).

　　8月GMAT機(jī)經(jīng)換庫(kù)了，現(xiàn)在就由小編來(lái)為大家整理八月份的GMAT閱讀機(jī)經(jīng)整理，下面是關(guān)于GMAT閱讀機(jī)經(jīng)的相關(guān)問(wèn)題，分享給大家，希望對(duì)大家有所幫助，文中觀點(diǎn)僅供參考。

　　本月原始

　　一個(gè)是staw 和 A什麼的experiment ，A的用相同的方法，但是讓research選design of advertising 和advertisement(字眼好像不同) 狗主說(shuō)有兩個(gè)題分別問(wèn)了staw和A的觀點(diǎn)~P2另一個(gè)人Armstrong又做了實(shí)驗(yàn)，其他都和STAW的一樣，只是選擇多了點(diǎn)兒(貌似那個(gè)意思)，多了advertisement or design of advertising

　　※往屆考古 已確認(rèn)

　　版本一

　　V1

　　說(shuō)一個(gè)人，為了證明一種叫...invest bias(好像是啊)的理論，設(shè)計(jì)了一種實(shí)驗(yàn)。把投資人分為兩組，分別投資到兩個(gè)項(xiàng)目中去。然后告訴一組人，他們的投資的其中一個(gè)項(xiàng)目回報(bào)率很低，結(jié)果很多人把更多的錢投入到這個(gè)項(xiàng)目中去。告訴另外一組人， 他們的他一個(gè)項(xiàng)目投資回報(bào)率很高，結(jié)果他們不愿意花更多的錢投入原來(lái)的項(xiàng)目了。

　　第二段講，另外一個(gè)人不同意他的結(jié)果，認(rèn)為這種結(jié)果不是general的情況，而且他的實(shí)驗(yàn)設(shè)計(jì)本身存在問(wèn)題。所以又設(shè)計(jì)了另外一種實(shí)驗(yàn)，也是兩組人兩種投資，但是投資的項(xiàng)目不同了，好像不只兩種，得出的結(jié)論就不一樣了。

　　關(guān)鍵詞：performance poor bias genral investor

　　版本二 有關(guān)投資傾向的實(shí)驗(yàn)比較 【背景知識(shí)】

　　V1(720)

　　P1關(guān)于Staw 這個(gè)人的一個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)是“什么 bias”的基礎(chǔ)，這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)大致是證明投資者傾向于更多的投資給programs they did not do well previously。實(shí)驗(yàn)是要一組人選擇兩種投資中的一種，一半的人被告知投資do well,另一半的人被告知投資did not do well。然后讓這些人再投資，而這次告訴他們可以將投資split投資于兩個(gè)項(xiàng)目，結(jié)果是之前被告知投資did not do well的人比被告知投資do well的人more intend to invest into the previous program(有考題，注意邏輯關(guān)系. (這段一句都沒(méi)有漏掉哦，厲害吧)

　　P2另一個(gè)人Armstrong又做了實(shí)驗(yàn)，其他都和STAW的一樣，只是選擇多了點(diǎn)兒(貌似那個(gè)意思)，多了advertise 和 (同學(xué)打個(gè)電話來(lái)一下又忘了，我錯(cuò)了。。。)，結(jié)論不記得了。Armstrong 的實(shí)驗(yàn)貌似dine的limitations of the ……can generalize,而staw 的不能generalize.還指出了staw的實(shí)驗(yàn)的不足，即沒(méi)有告知實(shí)驗(yàn)者相關(guān)投資回報(bào) 的信息。

　　其他題 main idea

　　Armstrong實(shí)驗(yàn)的特性

　　【背景知識(shí)】

　　Escalation Bias: Does ItExtend to Marketing?

　　JEscalation bias implies that managers favor reinvestments in projects that are doing poorly over those doing well. We tested this implication in a marketing context by conducting experiments on advertising and product-design decisions. Each situation was varied to rlect either a long-term or a short-term decision. Besides these four conditions, we conducted three replications. We found little evidence of escalationbias by 365 subjects in the seven experimental comparisons. Research on sunk costs shows that decision makers oftencontinue to invest unwisely because of commitments to priorinvestments (e.g., Arkes and Blumer 1985). Escalationresearch, starting withStaw (1976), yields evidence consistentwith research on the sunk-cost fallacy. In addition, escalation research has concluded that committed managersare likely to reinvest more inaproject when they receiveinformation that the project is doing poorly than if told it isdoing well. This has been called "escalation bias." This biasof "throwing good money after bad" has intuitive appeal.Should marketing managers be concerned about escalationbias? Common sense would say "yes." We examinedwhether escalation bias is likely to lead to poor marketingJournal of the Academy of Marketing ScienceVolume 21, Number 3, pages 247-253.Copyright 9 1993 by Academy of Marketing Science.All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.ISSN 0092-0703.

　　decisions. We first provide a bri review of the literature.This is followed by a series ofexperiments to test whetherescalation bias occurs in marketing decision making. Ourhypothesis was that escalation bias would occur for marketingdecisions.

　　BRIEF EVALUATION OF PRIOR RESEARCH

　　When people make a decision, they often develop a commitmentto it. This seems especially likely for people inorganizations. For example, Fox and Staw (1979) showedthat "trapped administrators" showed a higher level of commitmentto a previous course of action than "nontrappedadministrators." If decisions turn out poorly, the "escalationof commitment" hypothesis suggests that they may invest further so as to make the decision turn out well. Conlon and Parks (1987) called this retrospective rationality. In simple terms, decision makers are often unwilling to take a loss. Staw (1981, p. 577) commented that: Because it is often possible for persons who have suffered a setback to recoup their losses through an even greater commitment of resources to this same course of action, a cycle of escalating commitment can be produced. Staw and Ross (1987a) and Garland (1990) summarized a variety of reasons for the existence of escalation bias. For example, managers may be affected by partial reinforcement and have difficulty accepting information that rewards have disappeared. They might also distort negative information through perceptual dense mechanisms. Organization-JAMS 247 SUMMER, 1993

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